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Foreword
F O R E W O R D
Technologies drive change. The printing press, the railroad, the automobile, and
the many other technologies that make modern life possible have all, to varying
degrees, altered demographic patterns, shifted the distribution of wealth and
social caste, and affected the international power balance, influencing our lives
as individuals and as a society. In the twentieth century, life itself has been
markedly extended by applying the methods of civil engineering to large-scale
waste removal and water purification, and biomedical technologies to the search
for disease targets and associated therapeutics.
Until recently, the technologies of the modern age have been based largely
on the mechanical and electrical properties of matter; they have acted upon the
quality and style of life of individuals and societies but have had relatively little
effect on human nature.
The twenty-first century will see the emergence and influence of at least two
major technologies: computer science and genomics. The one deeply rooted in
communication, the physical sciences, and the cognitive sciences; the other
emerging from chemistry and biology. The intersection of the two, and each on
its own, can have profound consequences not just on the quality of life as we
know it, but on the nature of life itself—on its shape and form, on what it means
to be human.
B A C K G R O U N D
The importance of considering the social, political, and economic ramifications
of technology is widely recognized, and so-called technology assessment studies
are common, if not enlightening. Indeed, the federal government has responded
to the genomic revolution by substantially increasing its support for research
into the social implications of the new biology. 
Although this support has led to important developments in such areas as
patents, insurance, privacy, and civil liberties, most prognostications have been
rather short-ranged, limited to ten or twenty years. Some of the deepest implications
of science, however, are relevant to technologies that are not likely to be viable for
several generations. Serious discussion of this longer-range future is uncommon.
4G O A L S
Our conference focuses on scientific and technological advances in genetics,
computer science, and their convergence during the next 35 to 250 years. We are
especially interested in directed evolution, the futures it allows, the shape of
society in those futures, and the robustness of human nature against technologi-
cal change at the level of individuals, groups, and societies.
We take as a premise that biotechnology and computer science will mature
and will reinforce one another. During the period of interest, human cloning,
germ-line genetic engineering, and an array of reproductive technologies will
become feasible and safe. Early in this period, we can reasonably expect the pro-
cessing power of a laptop computer to exceed the collective processing power of
every human brain on the planet; later in the period human/machine interfaces
will begin to emerge. Whether such technologies will take hold is not known. But
if they do, human evolution is likely to proceed at a greatly accelerated rate;
human nature as we know it may change markedly, if it does not disappear alto-
gether, and new intelligent species may well be created. The goal of our sympo-
sium is to bring together leading scholars with diverse views from the
humanities and the social and natural sciences to reflect on the following:
• The feasibility and safety of technologies related to directed evolution,
including but not limited to germ-line gene engineering, human somatic cell
cloning, and computer interfaces with the central nervous system;
• The social factors that are likely to affect the adoption of these technologies;
• The consequences of adoption for the individual, the family, the nation, and
the world;
• The extent to which we can sensibly discuss the above, and the assumptions
we are making in such a discussion.
—Charles DeLisi and Kenneth Lewes
T H E  F U T U R E  O F  H U M A N  N A T U R E
A Symposium on the Promises and Challenges of the Revolutions in Genomics and Computer Science
5
Session SummariesConference Participant
P R E S E N T E R S  A N D  P A R T I C I P A N T S
George Annas
Edward R. Utley Professor of Health Law, Bioethics & Human Rights, 
Boston University School of Medicine, and School of Law
Chair of the Health Law Department, Boston University School of Public Health
Robert Berwick
Professor of Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
David Campbell
Provost ad interim; Dean, College of Engineering, Boston University
Charles Cantor
Professor, Biomedical Engineering, Boston University
Chief Scientific Officer, Sequenom Inc. 
(Member, National Academy of Science)
George Church
Professor of Genetics, Harvard Medical School 
Director, Lipper Center for Computational Genetics
Charles DeLisi
Senior Associate Provost for Biosciences; Arthur G. B. Metcalf Professor of 
Science and Engineering, Boston University
David Fromkin
Pardee Professor of Future Studies; University Professor; Professor of
International Relations, History, and Law, Boston University
Director, Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future
Anthony Gottlieb
Executive Editor, The Economist
Evelyn Fox Keller
Professor of History and Philosophy of Science, Program in Science, Technology
and Society, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Fellow
Daniel Kevles
Stanley Woodward Professor of History, Yale University
Kenneth Lewes
Psychoanalyst and Author
Lynn Margulis
University Professor, University of Massachusetts-Amherst
6Marvin Minsky
Toshiba Professor of Media Arts and Sciences; Professor of Electrical Engineering
and Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(Member, National Academy of Science)
Christine Peterson
Cofounder and President, Foresight Institute, Palo Alto, California
Steven Pinker
Peter De Florez Professor of Psychology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Stanley Rosen
University Professor; Borden Parker Bowne Professor of Philosophy, 
Boston University
Richard Schacht
Professor of Philosophy; Jubilee Professor of Liberal Arts and Sciences,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Roger Shattuck
University Professor Emeritus, Boston University
(Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences)
Lee M. Silver
Professor of Molecular Biology and Public Affairs, Princeton University
Alfred Tauber
Professor of Philosophy & Medicine; Director, Center for Philosophy 
and History of Science, Boston University
Tommaso Toffoli
Associate Professor of Electrical and Computing Engineering, Boston University
T H E  F U T U R E  O F  H U M A N  N A T U R E
A Symposium on the Promises and Challenges of the Revolutions in Genomics and Computer Science
7
Session One
S E S S I O N  O N E
Kenneth Lewes
Prolegomena
Welcome. We hope in the next few days you will hear more ideas and possibilities
than you can possibly handle. Although we constantly hear about the benefits
that the future will bring us, a coherent and broad view of technological progress
is not readily available. Since we fully expect that some of the projections to be
presented here will verge into the realm of science fiction, you might find it help-
ful if we suggest some ways of ordering and evaluating the welter of facts and
speculation you will soon hear presented.
This conference was stimulated by an exchange of letters in 1933 between
Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud on the prospects of eliminating war from
human experience. Einstein expressed a hope that human beings might be able
to resist another regression to a primitive way of settling conflicts between
nations. Freud, however, remained pessimistic for two reasons. He thought that
the obstacles in the way of international agreement were too substantial to be
overcome. But, more important, he thought that the impulse to destruction was
inherent in human nature itself. 
A consideration of current news, as well as a survey of recent cultural devel-
opments, suggests to some people that Freud may have been right. If so, it raises
some difficult questions that are directly relevant to some of the presentations
we will hear during this conference. Specifically, we must consider the complex
relation of our progressive and increasing scientific knowledge of the world and
its resulting technologies to what has up until now been our essential human
nature. In these terms, is the recent astonishing progress in science and technol-
ogy to be welcomed as the promise of a new Eden or dreaded as the threat of a
terrible nightmare? Should human beings be entrusted with the power that sci-
ence offers them? Or, on the contrary, have the age-old limitations on human
power been a protection from our own capacities for hatred and destruction?
One source for hope is the possibility that science, in the near future, may be
able to change human nature itself. This may happen by eliminating certain
destructive traits or by enhancing others. Or it may occur because the abundance
8that technologies can offer us will make greed and competition no longer neces-
sary for human survival. Yet even this hope brings along with it its own dread.
The brave new world of the future may finally prove to be a horrifying dictator-
ship or a bland, intolerable state of boredom. 
The very question of human nature, though abstract, impinges directly on
our ability to imagine and plan for a future. Are there constraints placed on pos-
sible developments by essential components of human nature? Or perhaps the
very nature of a human nature that transcends historical conditions is no longer
a useful idea and has been rendered obsolete by the promises of science and
technology. But if we discard the idea of an essential human nature, we are then
left with no apparent way of measuring, judging, or controlling the future as it
comes near. We are very far from being able to formulate these questions satis-
factorily, let alone provide a useful answer to them.
Another difficulty that arises if we think that science can change human
nature is trying to anticipate what will determine the shape and direction of sci-
entific and technological progress. Science, of course, possesses its own internal
determinants of what direction it will take. Nature and the world out there pro-
vide others. But equally powerful ones are generated by politics, social institu-
tions, and economics. It is important to remember that scientific and
technological progress, which seems to us so ineluctable, can be changed, redi-
rected, or completely stopped by changes in the culture. The kinds of critical
questions that once provided the themes for Victorian science fiction are turning
into the reality of today. We must learn to look at them with a seriousness and
steadiness that they never demanded of us before.
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S E S S I O N  O N E
Charles Cantor
Human Evolution at the Crossroads
One hundred years ago, DNA was unknown. Today we know the entire
DNA text of several human beings. Similar data exist on many model
organisms. We have gained the ability to manipulate this text almost at
will in organisms even as complex as mice. In the next few years our abil-
ity to do this will extend to humans. This means that we can now direct
and accelerate human evolution along any paths we deem desirable.
Hopefully, our wisdom in choosing these paths will match the power we
have gained in using them. It seems an inevitable consequence of evolu-
tion that some species eventually reach that key threshold where they
control their own evolution. This is now where we are.
The easy choices are to improve our quality of life by reducing the costs
and discomforts of the major diseases that today affect mankind. Surely
this is not controversial. However, there may well be differences of opin-
ion whether the ultimate goal is a longer life span or a more disease-free
existence at the current average life span. The hard choices are what
human properties do we enhance and which do we leave as is. That we
will shortly have such choices is astounding, but the implications are pro-
found. Should we enhance our olfactory capabilities, offer the capability
for regeneration; produce enhanced cognition; more efficient interfaces
with computers, wireless communication? In my crystal ball, boredom
could easily become the major scourge of an advanced human species;
yet surely we will find ways to keep fascinated or engineer ourselves
around this dilemma. Do we want to travel to far distances in the galaxy?
Both boredom and radiation sensitivity will need to be overcome to make
this feasible.
In my talk I will give an overview of the methods currently available to
direct human evolution: their current limitations, and the likely time scales
needed to overcome these limitations. But based on past experience, any
projections I make of the timing and magnitude of directed human evolu-
tion will be far too conservative. I will illustrate this dilemma with the cur-
rent explosion in the rate of discovery of the genes that underlie complex
human disease.*
*Copyright © 2003 Charles Cantor
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If I had given this talk ten years ago, my conclusions would have been the oppo-
site of those I come to today. I would simply have said, “None of this will ever
happen. We will never allow it.” Many individuals and institutions today share
my previous pessimism. Both the CIA and various think tanks for defense intelli-
gence are concerned about the risk that technology will destabilize society as we
know it. At the other end of the spectrum, there are the venture capitalists who
are concerned with how they are going to make money on the new technology.
Everybody tends to see these developments from his own narrow perspective, but
the time has come for us to try to think outside the box. In my own thinking on
this matter, I have found modern fiction to be very provocative and eye-opening.
A major cornerstone of modern biology is evolution. In its classical formula-
tion, the fittest species survive. This notion of fitness is really quite a boring
idea. All that matters is the number of fertile offspring. We must remember, how-
ever, that evolution takes place in a fluctuating environment and is not a contin-
uous, gradual process. It proceeds in fits and starts. That other thing to
remember is that the present is not the termination and end-all of the evolution-
ary process. Not only has evolution not stopped, but it probably is about to go
much faster. 
All of us—every species—is essentially a convolution of genes we are dealt at
birth and the environment we experience starting at conception. Any attempt to
predict on the basis of genes alone—or the environment alone—is doomed to fail-
ure. This has always been true, but the notion of evolution is changing. We are
still interested in the best genes for a given environment, but we now control the
environment. And, as a result of sequencing the human genome and the growth
of genetic engineering, we now control the genes. Our species is no longer sim-
ply buffeted by the environment; it now controls it. That is the power we now
have. In other words, natural selection no longer determines the evolutionary
process; artificial selection does.
One hundred years ago, DNA was unknown. Fifty years ago, before Watson
and Crick, we did not know that genes were DNA. Today, we have the entire DNA
sequences for some species and understand many of their rules. What will our
knowledge and technology be like in fifty years? Based on my own prediction
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and experiences, I would say that any prediction, even the most outlandish, will
prove too conservative. The Human Genome Project gave us a map with an inter-
state highway system on it that you could not really use to find anything specific.
Now we can find anything we want, and we can do it rapidly.
In my own organization, Sequenom, we discover genes that underlie com-
plex human traits and common, complex human diseases that affect everyone.
In the last eighteen months, we have done more human genetics than has been
done in the history of the planet. The automated system we have developed
makes up to two hundred thousand human genetic measurements a day. Using
it, we have discovered genes that underlie many of the diseases we care about:
skin cancer, cardiovascular disease, breast cancer, adult diabetes, HDL,
osteoarthritis, lung cancer, schizophrenia. We are finding genes that account for
about twenty-five percent of each of these diseases. An indication that we are on
the right track is the fact that, using blind studies, we have rediscovered genes
that we already knew were implicated in several diseases.
A major implication of these developments is that medicine will have to
change in dramatic and essential ways. This is because the inherited differences
that predispose us to disease will have to be addressed. This will require individ-
ualized therapy. At least half the targets we find responsible for human disease
are not addressable using traditional therapies. Instead the medicine of the
future will seek to contain disease using gene therapy. Medicine will move from
a reactive mode to a preventive one. The least controversial of the new gene ther-
apies is somatic, where a virus or stem cells are used, but do not enter the germ-
line and so are not inherited. Their effect is merely palliative. They disappear
when the organism dies. More problematic, however, because it is permanent
and inheritable, is the use of embryonic stem cells. These changes are passed on
to the offspring.
I think it is only a matter of time before human cloning and human germ-
line gene therapy become fairly standard. There are, however, cultural traditions
standing in the way of this development. Generally speaking, European tradi-
tions are suspicious of, if not hostile to, genetically modified organisms. On the
other hand, China and India are extremely enthusiastic about the possibilities.
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In some provinces in northern India, the sex ratio at birth is four males to three
females. The premier of China is on record as having said, “We will use genetic
engineering to change our people to reduce our health care costs.” It will not be
possible to stop such development. The driving force behind them is economics.
I do not know if it will be possible to develop a uniform set of rules regulat-
ing this kind of technological development. But the person who directs the selec-
tion is potentially the survivor. Nevertheless, it is not so difficult to make
predictions about some of the things we should not do. First, we must be careful
not to go down the road to homogenization. Evolution always favors diversity,
because it allows for survival in case the environment turns sour.
Homogenization is also very boring, and I think we have to be very afraid of
being bored in the future.
If one of us could take a trip forward two hundred years in a time machine, 
I am not sure he would be able to recognize humans, they would have changed so
utterly. We have the tools today not just to control evolution, but to speed it up in
a massive way. The cat is out of the bag. Evolution is in our hands. I only hope we
have the wisdom to use it wisely. 
S E S S I O N  O N E
Lee Silver
The Inevitability of Human Genetic Enhancement 
and Its Impact on Humanity
Incredible advances in reproductive and genetic technologies will someday
provide prospective parents with the ability to enhance their embryos so
that their children can be born with genetic advantages that they them-
selves do not carry. This technological leap into “reprogenetics” will be
the most important in the history of humankind because it could change
the very nature of the human species. There is much debate about both
the science and the ethics of human germ-line genetic engineering. Some
scientists claim it will never be possible to develop the technology for use
in a safe way. Many bioethicists believe that even if safety concerns are
overcome, it is still unacceptable to “tamper” with a child’s genes, even
to combat disease. I will argue that recent scientific advances leave no
doubt about future technical feasibility. I argue, as well, that nearly all of
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the objections raised by bioethicists are logically inconsistent or based 
on narrow religious beliefs. Instead, I believe the fundamental ethical
dilemma is rooted in the conflict between individual autonomy and social
equality. Principles of social equality might lead a society to reject the use
of a technology that could greatly widen the gap between affluent and
nonaffluent segments of humanity. In America, however, principles of indi-
vidual autonomy and noninterference into private family matters are para-
mount. And the natural desire of parents to give all possible advantages
to their children will be the driving force of reprogenetics. Each individual
use of reprogenetic technology may have no effect on society at large.
Indeed, in affluent societies, the technology could become quickly afford-
able to the middle class, and may even be promoted institutionally as a
way of reducing long-term societal health care expenses. But as genetic
enhancements accumulate from one generation to the next in affluent
countries, the gap between affluent and nonaffluent countries could
widen unimaginably until our species commonality is irrevocably severed.
The only alternative seems remote today and it may never be viable: 
a pan-global health maintenance system which provides all human
children with the same genetic protections and the same opportunities 
for health, happiness, and success.*
*Copyright © Lee M. Silver
In a liberal, democratic society, like the one we live in, individual parents have
the choice about what they do with their children. For example, they may spend
$150,000 to send their children to first-class universities, all for the chance of
providing their children with an advantage to succeed in life. In the near future,
we will see the technology which depends on our knowledge of DNA combine
with reproductive technology to give us reprogenetics, reproductive and genetic
technology, which will be able to ensure or prevent the inheritance of particular
genes in children. While there is a danger that governments may tell people what
to do with their children, it is more likely that individual parents will be deciding
what is best for them.
In the past, many eminent biologists doubted that genetic manipulation of
the kind we are discussing would ever be possible, primarily because of the infin-
itesimal sizes involved. We now know that it can be accomplished, and, in several
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cases, already is. Other doubts have arisen based on the margin of error involved.
Advances in technology, however, allow us to operate within acceptable risks. In
fact, very soon reproductive technology will operate at levels of risk below that of
natural sexual intercourse. Other doubts arise from religious and philosophical
objections to reproductive technologies and involve vague ideas about the
human soul or hesitations about taking on responsibilities that traditionally
have been left to divine power or the operations of chance.
Even people who espouse these philosophical objections are less clear when
they are faced with the specific choices that will become available to them. In the
United States there does not seem to be a consistent preference for the gender of
children; in other places in the world, there is. Most people, however, agree that
the prevention of disease in children is an appropriate aim. It is also only natural
for parents to wish to endow their children with advantages, especially those
that will affect their children’s economic success in later life.
There are several common examples of genetic manipulation that occurred
long before the discovery of DNA, which people accept almost as a matter of
course. The diversity of breeds of dogs with different physical and mental charac-
teristics, all from a single species of gray wolf, is a case in point. Another is the
development of modern corn from a weed that once grew in Mexico. In addition,
wool does not exist naturally, but was bred over centuries from a goat that was
hairy. Recently, more sophisticated engineering has made it possible to increase
the size of the cerebral cortex in mice. It is rapidly becoming possible to control
the distribution of certain traits that affect future economic success for individ-
uals. Height is an example. Should parents be able to determine characteristics
like these in their children? The natural distribution of traits is inherently
unfair. So is it unfair to control the distribution by choice and planning? Similar
arguments apply to susceptibility to disease, as well as to athletic, artistic, or
intellectual ability. Americans will ask, “Why can’t I give my children advanta-
geous genes that other children get naturally?” The issue boils down to who will
do the selection: God, nature, chance, the government, or parents. Parents should
be able to choose what they want for their children as long as they do no harm to
them. 
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It can still be asked if we are going to change human beings in an essential
way. With respect to the changes we have been discussing, we are not really
changing human nature, but only the frequencies of alleles in the population.
Two things basically define us as humans. One is the way we look, the other the
way we think. It is unlikely that the appearance of human beings will change in
the future beyond small, superficial characteristics, since it is essential that
human beings continue to find each other attractive. As for mental abilities, it is
unlikely that natural selection itself will change that, since smarter people do
not have more babies.
The issue of who will choose whether to enhance children genetically is very
difficult. At one extreme, the government can provide such services to all its citi-
zens. At the other, it could be left up to individual parents and their economic
condition. It is most likely that in the future there will be a widening gap
between people, especially those in rich and poor countries. Generation after
generation of genetic enhancements could accumulate until humanity finally
separates in distinct species. This, however, is not a scientific question, but a
social and political one. Scientists do not really control technology. It is people
and governments who use scientists and determine how all these technologies
will be used.
16
S E S S I O N  T W O
Marvin Minsky
What’s Wrong with People?
ABSTRACT NOT AVAILABLE
I will start by talking about what is wrong. If you make a list of serious problems,
you see that most of them are due to there being too many people. That includes
problems of garbage disposal, disease epidemics, the depletion of natural
resources, the disappearance of biodiversity, and the distribution of wealth. One
solution would be to reduce the size of people from six feet to six inches. That
way you could get a trillion people on the planet with less pollution.
Or we could reduce the size of neurons. Neurons might be filled with stuff
they do not need, and you could simplify them. Or if you could reproduce people’s
minds on computers, you could probably store the total amount of human mem-
ory on a CD. There’s no evidence that people have more than 100 megabytes of
knowledge. Nobody knows how to figure it out, but we have 50 trillion synapses.
In any case, although neuroscience is doubling every few months, we still do not
know simple things, like how memory works in any high-level sense.
There are also alternatives to traditional ways of having children and living
in families. When we understand what the genome contains, we could make
forty-six people. A fairly simply form of genetic surgery would be to decide which
are most important to you. Instead of implanting a whole nucleus, you ought to
be able to implant carefully selected chromosomes, so that forty-six people
altogether could have fifteen or twenty children. Then everybody would have lots
of relatives and live in a big family, and each person would reproduce for every
two in previous generations. 
My major point is that although there are many serious problems, we are
not smart enough to solve them. Right now it takes about 100 years to learn biol-
ogy. People do not live long enough to understand and solve biological problems.
Maybe we need to figure out how our minds work and put them in computers.
That has lots of advantages. You could live forever, since you can replace parts.
And there would be all sorts of wonderful enhancements you can get through
fairly simple biotechnology. People could communicate better, assuming you can
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translate between one private mental language and another, and international
travel could then be banned, because you could simply e-mail yourself to any
place without the risk of spreading diseases. 
One of the problems with smart machines is that the first thousand of them
would be wildly insane. After all, a very large percentage of people are quite
crazy, infested as they are with systems of memes called religion. Still, we may
well ask why we do not have artificial intelligence. So far, there has been a lot of
progress making machines that understand things in particular domains and
specialized areas. But around 1980, people discovered that, with the exception of
certain little pockets of mathematics, computers could not solve hard problems.
No computer can understand a first-grade children’s story. People then tried
inventing machines that would get smart, but nothing came of it.
Computers do not really think. A lot of people are trying to figure what con-
sciousness is, but, in fact, it may not be anything at all. Instead, there are twelve
or sixteen things that the mind does, each of which is pretty complicated, like
remembering what you just did. Other functions include envisioning different
possibilities, explicitly formulating plans, or comparing results. Looking for a
single answer or a single function is not going to be successful. Still, there are
lots of fads. The worst is building those stupid little robots, which concentrate on
doing something with minimal degrees of freedom. 
Similarly, the interest in logic is misguided. It is too rigid and inexpressive.
Nobody has gotten a logical system to make even childish analogies. And most of
thinking involves using analogies. Machines, to be effective, should do their
thinking in a natural language, like English, where each word may have a dozen
meanings and contains metaphors that have been evolved by millions of people
for thousands of years. Ambiguities allow you to change an approach a little bit
and not get stuck in a problem. Logic is appropriate in the world of mathematics,
but not when you are learning by example and analogy. 
There has been some recent work on how to get common-sense knowledge
into computers. At first they tried logic, but quickly ran into problems. If you try
to make an orderly hierarchy without sufficient cross connections, you get two
rather similar things very far apart on the tree, because of the differences
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between function and structure, for example. I concluded that you should clas-
sify knowledge by the kind of problems it can solve. As yet, we do not have a clas-
sification of that sort.
Thinking must have evolved into many ill-defined states. Bacteria have
many programmed reactions, but cannot solve a problem by imaging two differ-
ent actions, envisioning the results, and then comparing them. That is what
humans and some primates do on the deliberative level. We need all these differ-
ent levels, not some magic bullet that tries to do everything.
My own general scheme looks a little like Freud’s, who was the first to make
a sophisticated architecture of how the mind works. In all cases, there is an
expectation of what should happen, but then there is a bug. I am not looking for
a general, elegant solution that has just a few parts. Instead, I think in terms of a
large computer system that works pretty well but has bugs. Then people fix the
bugs. That is what evolution does.
S E S S I O N  T W O
Christine Peterson
Preserving Human Nature: Peaceful Coexistence Among Diverse
Entities in a World of Hyper-Advanced Technology
It is possible to make potentially useful projections regarding technologi-
cal developments in the 50-to-250-year time frame, but strong discipline
is needed to avoid our natural tendency to focus on nearer-term issues.
Organizers of the Conference on the Future of Human Nature are hereby
encouraged to continually redirect the group into discussing the desired
time frame. This will be difficult given the senior level of many partici-
pants—not to mention their independent natures—but it will be neces-
sary in order to make any progress on the challenge before us.
Serious forecasts in the target time frame must include what we would
regard today as extraordinarily advanced technology. If our scenarios do
not “sound like science fiction,” we will have failed at our task.
For purposes of this essay, human nature can be thought of as the set of
characteristics our species has shared for millennia in the past. Rather
than specify these in more detail here, we’ll borrow the famous judge’s
quote on another topic: “We can’t define it, but we know it when we see
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it.” The case presented here is that it should be possible for our species
to continue into the long-range future, where, by definition members of
“our species” are entities sharing what we think of today as “human
nature.”
Assumptions
The assumptions we need to make in order to have any coherent discus-
sion of the 50-to-250-year time frame include the belief that some tools
we use today will still be applicable, e.g., the laws of physics, the laws of
economics, and the laws of human nature—this last defined above to be
roughly stable for current purposes. Our understanding of these laws
changes over time, but to have a discussion now we need to assume that
some of today’s tools will still be useful in the future.
Technologies of Matter and Information
Our understanding of human nature today includes the fundamental ten-
dency of some members of our species to do creative engineering: to
make new technologies, both physical and informational. This, combined
with the laws of physics and economics, is expected to lead to a capacity
for total control of the structure of matter, down to the individual atoms.
Results should include systems of molecular machinery which are more
complex than those evolved by nature. Time estimates on the nearest
end of our 50-to-250-year time frame; many expect it even earlier. Terms
for this include: molecular nanotechnology, molecular manufacturing, and
“strong” nanotechnology. It can be regarded as a highly advanced form of
artificial “dry” biotech: molecular machine systems under external design
and control, with a level of complexity equivalent to, and even beyond,
today’s most complex such systems (ourselves).
One result of this technology should be computers of mind-boggling raw
computational ability: at a minimum, the power of a billion of today’s
desktop machines in the volume of a sugar cube. Raw power does not
automatically translate into machine intelligence, but combined with evolu-
tionary strategies in software, we can expect computational entities with
human-level intelligence to arrive on the near-term end of our 50-to-250-
year period. Unlike humans, these entities should be able to “think”
together in a tightly integrated way, so we should assume that shortly
after arrival they will surpass us in raw intelligence.
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In considering the future of directed evolution of our species in the time
frame of interest, we need to keep in mind these other technological
developments. Our species’ technical ability to change the structures of
ourselves and our offspring should be far in advance of germ-line genetic
engineering and human somatic cell cloning. It should be possible to con-
struct tissues and organs without using biological mechanisms at all, if
desired. Changes more extreme than those encoded, or even encodable,
in DNA should be technically possible.
A major benefit of these abilities is that it should become unnecessary to
implement genetic changes on future generations, regardless of how dis-
astrous a given gene is. Rather than tamper with DNA, the needed
change could be implemented directly, enabling health without altering
genes. The problem gene would remain in place, with its undesired opera-
tion compensated for in other ways. One early application we should
expect is computer interfaces with the central nervous system; crude
efforts at this are underway even today, in attempts to enable the blind to
receive visual signals. Given the level of technology expected in the 50-to-
250-year time frame, we should assume that these interfaces will
become seamless, and that what will appear externally to be a standard
human body may contain computational power many orders of magnitude
beyond today’s humans. A minor result is that sense data reaching such
an entity should be assumed to be recorded internally, regardless of copy-
right rules.
Eastern vs. Western Attitudes
In speculating on the social factors affecting the adoption of various
directed evolution technologies, we can build on observations of early pat-
terns seen today. Germ-line engineering, reproductive cloning, and even
stem cell research are controversial in Western countries, roughly corre-
lating with the prevalence of Christian-based values. In contrast, countries
whose belief systems have other bases, especially much of Asia and the
Middle East, are not finding these technologies so objectionable and are
moving forward. (An exception is the Chinese Academy of Sciences ban
on reproductive cloning, for reasons of “ethical morality.” In contrast,
stem cell research is actively encouraged in China, Saudi Arabia, and
Israel.)
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However, as sketched above, in the 50-to-250-year time frame we can
expect to move beyond controversial biological techniques to those which
fix problems without changing DNA or harming embryos. Western ethical
objections may decrease.
Today we are seeing ambivalence in the West toward technologies that
promise major changes in the human body, such as the distinct-but-
related goals of extending human life span and improving human perfor-
mance significantly. Today’s U.S. administration includes both ethics
advisor Leon Kass, who opposes life extension, and nanotechnology
initiative leader Mihail Roco, who advocates human performance
enhancement. From this we can speculate that deep controversies can 
be expected in the West on whether “improving” the human body should
be publicly funded, or even permitted. But again, it is not clear these
issues will be controversial in much of Asia, where a “full steam ahead”
attitude may well prevail. If these technologies are seen as militarily or
economically important—highly likely—the West may feel forced into
moving forward in parallel, regardless of disagreements.
The Goal: Peaceful Coexistence
Given the seeming inevitability of a wide variety of entities in the 50-to-
250-year time frame—including traditional humans, augmented humans,
and machine-based intelligences—an obvious goal is to work for peaceful
coexistence. This would include ensuring that the use of augmentation
technologies is voluntary, and that the physical security and assets of
humans are protected against coercion. A subgoal would be that tradi-
tional human families and communities continue to be able to live as they
choose, without either physical force or confiscatory taxation levels mak-
ing it impossible for them to live by their traditions.
How can this be accomplished in a world with entities that are far more
intellectually (and, presumably, economically) powerful than traditional
humans? Our species already has some experience in handling such enti-
ties: our governments. The best answer found to date seems to be the
use of checks and balances. Additional insight can be obtained from the
field of strategy known as game theory. Preliminary theoretical work has
been done on this issue by nanotechnology theorist K. Eric Drexler and is
now being written up for publication.
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Summary
In the 50-to-250-year time frame, we can expect advanced molecular man-
ufacturing and machine intelligence to far surpass near-term biological
directed evolution techniques. Military and economic competition will drive
these technologies to be used by nations which desire to remain in posi-
tions of technological dominance. The goal becomes to protect the safety
and assets of traditional humans, i.e., those who exhibit what we today
call human nature.*
Special thanks to Foresight chairman K. Eric Drexler for advice on this
essay.
*Copyright © 2003 Christine Peterson 
I will try to be as outlandish in my projections as I can here, but I nevertheless
think that my ideas are probably too conservative. Things will change radically.
The question we need to consider, therefore, is not “Can we change human
nature?” but “How can we preserve it?” Whenever one thinks about progress in
the next two hundred years, one begins to sound like a science fiction writer.
This is not entirely unfortunate. Many of them spend a lot of time thinking
about these subjects, and some of them are not stupid. Some of them have back-
grounds in physics and biology. 
I am not prepared to say exactly what human nature is. I will just say that it
is a set of characteristics that we have had for quite a while. So assuming that
people are not going to change very much in the next 250 years, let us start with
some basic things we already know about people. First, people want more money.
Second, there is also the tendency of a subset of our species to do creative engi-
neering and push technology forward. If you add these things up, what you get is
technological advance to the limits allowed by nature. Estimating time limits is
more difficult. But applying Moore’s Law to technological progress, we estimate
that we will achieve total control of the structure of matter down to individual
atoms by 2017.
In the near future, we can look forward to molecular manufacturing. Today
we have already achieved atomic precision at a very minute scale. We can also
make large, complex structures that are not atomically precise. The goal now is
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to do both—to build anything we want, no matter how big, and control it down to
the atomic level. The most exciting application of this technology will be to the
human body. We will be able to tackle all diseases and aging. To do this, we will
be inspired by the way living systems work. After all, we are systems of molecu-
lar machines, with little machines inside us. We are beginning to understand
and control these processes.
Beyond that, we will arrive at the point where we will not have to model our-
selves on natural machines any longer. Instead we could design quite different
machines. The difficulties, of course, are great, but the payoffs are immense,
both economic and military. Presently we are able to design machines whose
parts consist of individual atoms and molecules. Machines such as these give us
enormous raw power. We will soon be able to put the equivalent of one billion
desktop computing machines into the volume of a single sugar cube. 
Combining this kind of raw power with evolutionary strategies, we will be
able to understand how evolution created intelligence, and, being able to dupli-
cate it on whatever level of detail is required, we could do it all over again. That
would give us human-level machine intelligence that is far smarter than we are.
We could also construct tissues and organs without using natural biological
mechanisms to do so. An artificial liver, for example, would do everything that a
natural liver does, but not look at all like a liver. We would not have to worry
about how these artificial organs might change the way we look, since all of
them would be internal. 
These developments bring up certain ethical questions. One of them con-
cerns passing permanent genetic changes on to our offspring. One solution
would be confining ourselves to non-genetic changes to our children and defer-
ring genetic changes until they are old enough to decide for themselves. Such
changes might involve the integration of machines into humans or implanting
chips into people. When nanotechnology is fully developed, we can expect seam-
less integration. So the human body, which will continue to look standard on the
outside, would be quite different internally. Human enhancements could include
immense computational abilities and increased recording capacities for sense
data, including new ones. 
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Attitudes towards these controversial biological technologies vary greatly
from country to country. Asia, in particular, does not share American reserva-
tions about technological advances. But other Western countries, like Sweden,
are not as inhibited as we are. There are economic and military reasons why the
West will eventually feel that it must move forward with technology, especially in
the area of improving and enhancing human performance in general. We cer-
tainly want augmentation and enhancement to be voluntary options. Many peo-
ple presently do not want to avail themselves of these possibilities, but this point
of view is falling by the wayside. I personally think that parents should not make
such decisions for their children.
As long as there is a choice, however, there will be imbalances in power,
intelligence, and wealth. And with imbalances in power comes the possibility of
physical coercion. We will want to protect weaker entities in our society from
stronger ones, just as we do today. The police and the military exist to protect
weaker members of society from those who would want to coerce them. People
should be able to choose to continue to live in the way they wish. We should also
try to preserve traditional families and communities. They need to be able to live
without interference by physical force or very high levels of taxation. The Amish
are an example. The best way of ensuring this goal is through a system of gov-
ernmental checks and balances, where the government as a segmented entity
plays the different parts off against each other. 
In summary, in the time frame we are looking at—which is not very far off—
we can expect advanced molecular manufacturing, machine intelligence, and
genetic engineering techniques that will far surpass what we see today. The
challenge is to protect and preserve human diversity.
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S E S S I O N  T H R E E
Steven Pinker
Can We Change Human Nature?
After decades of exile, the concept of human nature is back. It has been
rehabilitated both by scientific findings that the mind has a universal,
genetically shaped organization, and by philosophical analyses that have
dispelled the fear that the concept is morally and politically tainted. So if
human nature exists, can it be changed? Attempts to redesign human
nature by directed evolution (eugenics) or directed social engineering (rev-
olutionary utopianism) are generally recognized as futile, dangerous, and
unnecessary to achieve moral and political progress. What about volun-
tary changes, such as parents genetically engineering their children?
Despite widespread concern that human genetic engineering will change
human nature, I present a number of reasons for skepticism that it will
ever be a significant phenomenon. 
(1) There is a built-in bias toward luridness and glibness among scien-
tists and journalists who write about technological change over long
time spans in the future. Their dramatic predictions rarely come true.
(2) Though we have good reason to believe that tens of thousands of
genes acting in complex combinations affect mental abilities in the
course of development, we have no reason to believe that a single
gene (or a small number of them) could be inserted in a fetus to
enhance mental abilities. 
(3) Most genetic effects are probabilistic: identical twins, for example,
are similar, but they are far from indistinguishable. 
(4) The human species comprises six billion individuals whose mental
traits vary quantitatively in statistical distributions. It would take 
an unimaginably massive intervention to shift these distributions
significantly. 
(5) Ethical constraints on experimentation with humans impose an
impediment to research and development on human genetic
enhancement, preventing the high-speed trajectories we have seen in
other areas of technology. 
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(6) People make choices according to their costs and benefits, not
according to their benefits alone. It is far from clear that the imagina-
ble benefits of genetic engineering (such as a child with some proba-
bility of having a slightly higher IQ) will outweigh the costs, such as
the trauma and expense of IVF, the risk of a deformed child, and vio-
lations of deep-seated intuitions about naturalness (which act as a
brake on the acceptance of other technologies, such as genetically
modified food). Similar skepticism should surround other claims
about radical changes in human nature such as those surrounding
enhancing drugs and human-machine interfaces. These uncertainties
speak against restricting beneficial research on the basis of
dystopian fantasies.*
*Copyright © 2003 Steven Pinker
Before I get to the subject of human nature itself, I’d like to say a few words
about the concept of human nature. Presently, we are witnessing a rediscovery
of the concept of human nature. Part of this comes from common sense. Anyone
who has raised a child knows that children are not indistinguishable lumps of
putty waiting to be shaped.  They come into the world with a distinct personality.
The environment alone does not determine behavior. Innate abilities play a role.
The concept of human nature has been also rejuvenated by the recent study of
human universals, despite traditional anthropological emphasis on differences
in culture, which, of course, can be profound. Finally, the importance of our
genetic endowment has been highlighted by discoveries in behavioral genetics
and cognitive neuroscience. 
MRI images of related living human brains show that large amounts of gray
matter are influenced by the degree of genetic similarity. These similarities are
not just meaningless differences in anatomy, but have well-known consequences
for intelligence and personality. Studies of identical twins separated at birth
show astonishing similarities in personality, intellect, and many idiosyncratic
personal quirks. So, if there is such a thing as human nature, we may well ask if
we are able to change it.
There have been notorious attempts to change human nature in the twenti-
eth century, like the New Socialist Man of Stalinist Russia, the coercive eugenics
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of Nazism, as well as milder forms which occurred in Western democracies. I will
set these to the side and concentrate instead on a more benign form of changing
human nature—namely voluntary genetic engineering. Many people believe that
it is simply a matter of time before designer babies become a reality, and that we
should anticipate and intervene now before it is too late.
I have a somewhat skeptical view of that inevitability. In fact, I have three
reasons for thinking it highly unlikely that it will happen within our lifetime.
The first is the historical fallibility of predictions about complex technology. 
The second are the theoretical impediments to changing human nature that
arise from the study of behavioral genetics. And third is some difficulties of
changing human nature that arise from human nature itself.
Predictions about the future based on the development of complex technolo-
gies are notoriously unreliable. There are several reasons for this. First, is the
fallacy of constructing a linear or exponential extrapolation for progress.
Moore’s Law has been applied without justification to almost anything. Second,
prognosticators often underestimate the number of things—technological, psy-
chological, and sociological—that have to go exactly right for the projected sce-
nario to take place. Third, many futurologists do not adequately consider the
costs as well as the benefits of a new technology. Finally, there is the general
built-in incentive for dramatic futurological predictions. People pay less atten-
tion to a prediction that things will be pretty much the same as they are now.
The prospect for designed babies is further qualified by what we already
know about behavioral genetics and neural development. The most important of
these findings is the rarity of single genes that have consistent beneficial psy-
chological effects. Tens of thousands of genes working together have a large
effect on the mind, but so far we have found no single genes that can explain
schizophrenia, autism, or OCD, let alone talents like musical ability, likeability,
intelligence, and so on. The human brain is not a bag of traits, with one gene for
each trait. Neural development is staggeringly complex, with many genes inter-
acting among each other in complex feedback loops. The effects of genes are
often non-additive, and the pattern of the expression of genes is as important as
which genes are present. 
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There are other impediments to genetic enhancement. Even identical twins
raised in the identical environment don’t end up identically. Sheer chance and
stochastic processes play an enormous and underappreciated role in making us
who we are. Genes also have multiple dominance effects. The effect a gene has
depends on what other allele it is paired with. Most genes have multiple effects,
and evolution selects for the best compromise. There are also ethical impedi-
ments to research on human enhancement. We do not know how to make these
processes safe or to weed out deleterious side effects. Finally, most genes are
desirable at intermediate, not extreme, values.
Last of all, there are some impediments in human nature itself to enhancing
it. Although it may be true that most parents wish for the best for their children
and want to provide them with a competitive edge, an equally strong parental
motivation is the wish to spare their children any harm or the risk of harm. We
must also recognize the widespread aversion to artificial life forms and technolo-
gies that are viewed as sinister. For genetic enhancement to change human
nature, not just a few, but billions would have to agree to it.
For all of these reasons—the complexity of neural development, the rarity of
single genes with consistent beneficial effects, the tradeoffs of risks and bene-
fits of genetic enhancement—I do not think that changing human nature by vol-
untary genetic enhancement is inevitable. An effective bioethics policy should
acknowledge the unreliability of long-term technological predictions and base
itself on fact, not the fantasy of exponential extrapolation.
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S E S S I O N  T H R E E  
Richard Schacht
The Future of Human Nature
The idea of human nature once was quite respectable in philosophy; but it
came under attack from many quarters in the course of the 20th century,
and has fallen into such disfavor that it now is rarely even mentioned in
polite philosophical society, and is generally shunned in the curricula of
mainstream philosophy departments. I consider this to be unfortunate;
and, after a glance at this sorry history of the idea’s decline and fall, I
argue that the time has come to resurrect it—or rather, to revisit and
rethink it—in a manner that can and should give it a new lease on philo-
sophical life. In doing so I make common cause with David Hume, and to
an even greater extent with Friedrich Nietzsche, who is often (but quite
wrongly) thought to be one of the arch-enemies of the very idea of human
nature. Both were critics of metaphysical conceptions of some sort of
human essence; but both were advocates of naturalistic reconceptions of
our human nature, and of its philosophical investigation in a manner
attuned if not restricted to what can be learned about it by way of the vari-
ous human sciences. I suggest what some of the themes of such a
“philosophical anthropology” might be, and conclude with a sketch of
some of my own thinking along these lines, to give a more concrete indi-
cation of the sort of philosophical approach to the question of human
nature that I believe has—or at any rate, deserves to have—a future.*
*Copyright © 2003 Richard Schacht
I am in essential agreement with Steven Pinker’s position, although I will say a
few other things later on which perhaps diverge from him. To start with, I would
like to say something about what happened to the concept of human nature in
twentieth-century philosophy, and then to go on to discuss David Hume and
Friedrich Nietzsche, who powerfully and interestingly revived the concept.
Finally I want to conclude, after speaking somewhat critically about the notion,
to suggest some things that are still worth talking about.
The question of whether there is anything beyond the strictly biological that
is true about human nature is still a subject of hot debate. Michel Foucault and
his followers, for example, think that the idea is a nineteenth-century misunder-
standing whose time has long passed. They admit that there are, of course, plenty of
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human beings around, but all of them are historically contingent affairs. They
deny that there is anything like a blueprint of humanity that we all exemplify or
ought to exemplify. These attitudes, extreme though they sometimes seem, are
quite representative of many twentieth-century philosophers of various schools. 
This, however, was not always the case. John Locke and David Hume both
emphasized the concept, and French Enlightenment philosophers took up the
idea with enthusiasm, as did Hegel. With Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche,
however, the situation becomes more complicated. All three had deep and signifi-
cant sets of reservations about the concept. A movement called philosophical
anthropology revived some of these ideas in the 1920s, but it was overshadowed
by Heidegger, the Second World War, and then by existentialism, Marxism, post-
structuralism, and deconstruction. 
Most twentieth-century schools of philosophy reject the n0tion of human
nature as philosophically useful. Phenomenologists object to the idea of assum-
ing that our nature is fundamentally human, and existentialists insist that exis-
tence precedes essence. They also think that the notion of human nature serves
to help us avoid facing our ultimate freedom and responsibility. Marxists con-
demn the idea as a reactionary ideological construct intended to subvert the
recognition for the need for a profound transformation of social and economic
conditions. Similarly structuralists reject the notion for the way it detracts atten-
tion away from historically contingent arrangements.
Although many of these schools claim Nietzsche as their spiritual grandpar-
ent, my own reading of that philosopher finds him to be an important proponent
of the concept. He was the heir of Hume, who proposed establishing a science of
human nature. Nietzsche explicitly proclaimed his project of naturalizing our-
selves in a newly redeemed notion of human nature and of attaining a kind of
anthropological optic in thinking about philosophical questions. Although the
common view of Nietzsche sees him as taking a strongly reductionist and bio-
logistic point of view, I see him as thinking of animal life as having been trans-
formed and shaped with the advent of society into human life, stressing both
social and cultural phenomena. For him, our humanity has a history and a genel-
ogy, and it remains capable of further transformation. 
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Human life for Nietzsche is both a biological and a socio-cultural affair.
Social and cultural diversity stand in contrast to the relative constancy and uni-
formity of our biological constitution. Human life is open-ended with respect to
the possibility of the emergence of new socio-cultural forms. That is why a good
deal of what goes on in human life is not explicable in merely biological terms.
This socio-cultural supervenience might be called our true supernaturalism. We
are creatures of nature who have outgrown our animality. A thoroughgoing
dialectic of nature and nurture makes it impossible to disentangle them.
Our human nature is therefore a question of biology, our historicality, and
our psychosomaticity, which includes our senses, our emotions, and our sexuali-
ties. The dynamics of the interrelations between the psychosomatic and the
socio-cultural are the heartbeat of humans. Another feature is objectification,
the way subjectivity finds its objects in and undergoes transformation under the
impact of humanly produced objectivities. Our nature also includes the phenom-
enon of human intersubjectivity, mediated by symbols, conventions, and institu-
tions, but not fixed by any of their forms and structures. Another feature of our
human existence is our relation to our own bodies, a thing we both have and are.
In a similar way, we have both brains and minds. All this is bound up in the gene-
ology of our humanity.
This is only a small list of topics that might constitute the agenda suggested
by Hume and Nietzsche. It posits a notion of human beings quite different from
that of traditional Western philosophy, starting from Plato. It also differs from
the one we find among those who take a cognitive science point of view, which
sees the mental dimension of human life as just disguised neurophysiological
events. Although everything that goes on in us has these dimensions, such an
analysis does not take us very far in understanding human reality, which finds
its objective expression and embodiment in social and cultural phenomena.
The information we take in is schematized and bound up with the interpre-
tive and evaluative contexts within which its meaning is constituted. We take in
these systems, and, as we learn them, we make modifications and refinements.
We relate to each other by means of them. These representations owe at least as
much to the symbolic systems we internalize as to the sensory and neural appa-
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ratuses with which we are endowed. It is the meaning content of the representa-
tions, not the locus where such representations become effective, that is of para-
mount importance in human life. And that content requires an analysis that
reflects its symbolic elaboration and socio-cultural objectification. 
Nietzsche thought that we could make naturalistic sense of this project. 
We can imagine a Hobbsian creature, a body with a brain, entering into group
arrangements that emphasize the development of communication and the coor-
dination of behavior. These lead to more complex social arrangements and to
further elaborated systems of conventions and rules. In addition, relations
among elements can begin to affect their very use and function, and various
social dynamics, in turn, can come to be reflected in them. The resulting concep-
tual, interpretative, and evaluative schemes come to structure ways in which
human beings encounter each other. Their existence has come to be mediated 
by socially generated domains of symbolic phenomena. Psychosomatic human
nature has not disappeared, but has been transmuted and superceded. And it 
has also entered into socially and symbolically constructed forms of life. 
As human beings, we often do things in response to some event, signal, or
communication in the socio-cultural world. The brain is certainly involved in
this, but it is not the only party running the show. The brain makes our remark-
able manner of existence possible. It determines what forms these social and
symbolic structures will take and what courses of events will unfold. Other ani-
mals have brains, but they are quite oblivious to the sorts of things we respond
to. This is because they lack minds. What is needed to mediate between symbolic
systems and neural processes underlying behavior? There must be a way of inter-
nalizing them and representing their contents. In other words, there must be an
intermediary between an objectified symbolic order and the neural order. 
Our minds work with a kind of social symbolic education. We have a neural
apparatus, but in describing it, we must remember the difference between the
truth and the whole truth. I think that the idea of human nature does have a future
and that a consideration of it from both philosophical and scientific points of
view is not only possible, but quite interesting. It will, of course, remain a rather
untidy and tentative affair.  But the same is true with respect to human life itself.
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S E S S I O N  F O U R
Daniel Kevles
Science and the Deconstruction of Human Nature
The century-long trend to reductionism in the life sciences has increas-
ingly impacted ideas of human nature. Various lines of scientific investiga-
tion have revealed that human beings are physico-chemical machines;
that their mental processes can be seen in vivid colors on imaging
machines; that their physical and behavioral traits can be tied to genes.
The trend to reductionism has reached deeply into the medical arena,
where the person is often dealt with as a collection of parts to be diag-
nosed, repaired, or even replaced. The trend has been exacerbated by
biotechnology and law, which together have created a market and intellec-
tual property rights in human genetic parts. But these developments need
not reduce conceptions of human nature to commercializable entities of
physics and chemistry nor void our notions of humanness. We think of
ourselves as something more than the operations of genes and firing neu-
rons, and we insist on treatment that respects personhood, autonomy,
and dignity. Such considerations have found expression in the imposition
of ethical constraints in human subject research, European patent law,
and the response to the prospect of human cloning.*
*Copyright © 2003 Daniel J. Kevles
I would like to talk about a profound revolution that has recently occurred in our
perception of ourselves as human beings, and then discuss this development in
some sort of historical perspective. This contemporary revolution, which is about
genetics and neuroscience, is really the third in historical memory. The first, of
course, involved the removal of the earth from the center of the universe. The
second, Darwin’s revolution, destroyed our sense of uniqueness in the realm of
living beings. Both, however, left us with the sense that as human animals we
are uniquely endowed with high intelligence, a basket of emotions and capacities
for morality, aesthetics, language, culture, and science—in short with the capaci-
ties that lie at the core of what we call human nature. My concern today is not
really with the scientific and scholarly aspects of this shift in attitude, but with a
change in how people in the larger culture think about human nature. 
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While it may be true that notions of human nature have been out of fashion
in scholarship and philosophy for a century or so, most people until recently
would have agreed that there is such a thing as human nature. The current revo-
lution challenges that conception by deconstructing us into constituent body
parts. This is not, of course, an entirely new development. For more than a cen-
tury we have known that we are physical and chemical machines, in terms of our
bodily structure and functions, not to mention breakdowns and dysfunction.
Still, the deconstruction of our day strikes at the essence and autonomy of being
human. Two developments lie at the core of this shift: the rapid advances in
human genetics, coupled with the new reproductive technologies; and the stun-
ning advances in the neurosciences. Such progress has both fascinated the pub-
lic and also caused a degree of worry and anxiety.
Recombinant DNA has emancipated human genetics from a dependence on
analyzing family pedigrees by allowing it to isolate individual genes and analyze
their function in terms of DNA coding. Now the swift mapping and sequencing of
the human genome is steadily revealing the code’s actual contents and thus
allowing us to obtain the specific blueprint for any one of us. Drawing a blue-
print of what is essential to our human functions, especially emotion and cogni-
tion, deflates the sense of wonder we may once have felt about human life.
Rapidly expanding neurosciences have been exposing how our senses and cogni-
tive abilities are the products of neurotransmitters, hormone surges, neural net-
works, and a hundred billion intricately connected nerve cells. Neurobiologists
can detect function in particular regions of the brain by keying in on neurotrans-
mitters. Such techniques have been used not only to study disease, but also to
analyze certain abnormal, especially socially destructive, behaviors. 
Many expect that genetics and the neurosciences will ultimately meld, so
that genes will be correlated with what brain scans reveal. The result will be a
genetic functional account of our behavior and our human identities. Our mate-
riality and the physiological process that governs it will account for our capacity
for being human. According to some biologists, these capacities include art and
aesthetics, which are seen as selected products of evolution. 
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Developments in genetics and neuroscience have led to a remarkable shift
in the social uses of human biology. In the previous century, social Darwinism
and its ally, eugenics, were often used by conservatives to block the attempt to
improve the condition of individuals through ameliorating the social environ-
ment. Eugenicists saw the proliferation of suffering or deprived people as a
threat to the quality of American society. But biological eugenics was also
embraced by progressives, who were attempting to halt trends to degeneration.
Using science, even for progressive social and political ends, often resulted in
the curtailment or damage to individual liberties.
The contemporary biologization of behavior, however, is not yet being used
as a warrant for social engineering. In fact, the trend now is to use it to emanci-
pate people from moral responsibility. If it’s in your nature to misbehave, then
it’s not your fault. One response to a no-fault biology, of course, would be to mod-
ify the environment as a compensation for defects in biology. The most recent
trends, however, seem not to be addressed to changing the environment, but to
resorting to pharmaceuticals to change the individual. Similarly, although gene
therapies are used to protect against disease, they may also be used to enhance
characteristics that society deems valuable, such as intelligence, athletic ability,
and beauty. One sign of the recent decomposition of human nature is the wide-
spread belief that you can change it. 
One remarkable feature of recent trends in biologization is that it is occur-
ring in an intensely commercial, free-market environment. There are many
alarming consequences of this combination. The acquisition of genetic informa-
tion can be used to deny insurance or employment. The incentives for traffic in
human body parts, including those in which our essence is thought to be concen-
trated, are powerful. In this legally sanctioned realm of commodification, patent
protection has been extended to genetically engineered plants, animals, and
human genes, and could conceivably extend to genetically engineered human
body parts or even human beings themselves. 
Many people are concerned about the potential impact of biotechnology on
ineffable human qualities such as individuality, ambition, or genius. The use of
psychopharmacology is similarly alarming in the way it makes deviant or incon-
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venient behavior into a pathology that merits chemical restoration to a conform-
ist norm. Francis Fukuyama, in particular, worries that basic notions of justice,
morality, or human rights are being undermined by biotechnological develop-
ments. He fears that the enterprise is too driven by commerce and ambition to
exercise self-restraint, and he calls for the laying down of a political marker at
an early point in development to demonstrate that the development of these
technologies is not inevitably beyond control. 
Such alarms may be a kind of overreaction. The trend to biologization has
been pervaded by considerable scientific extravagance. No one knows much about
how genes actually control behavior, how neural networks make for perception
and knowledge, or how the complex system of the brain works to create conscious-
ness. It is not likely that under the United States Constitution anyone will be able
to hold property rights in another human being. Still, we need ethics in this realm.
If ethics is relegated to peripheral and obsolete questions, while industry decon-
structs, redesigns, and manufactures human components like any other commod-
ity, laws that exempt these components from patenting, licensing, and other
property rights will lose their moral basis. The United States has taken the lead in
the recent biologization and commercialization of the components of human
nature, and it is the Old World that has insisted on the introduction of ethics in
this area. It may be that with the globalization of the high-tech economy, a similar
impact will be felt in the way we treat the deconstruction of human nature.
We managed to absorb the conceptual consequences of our Copernican
dethronement from the center of the universe, and people who accept the
Darwinian theory of evolution do not nowadays resort to a primitive nihilism.
Most Americans are appalled by the excesses of previous movements in eugenics
and sterilization, even if they do not understand the shoddiness of the science
that underlay them. Surely we can live with the knowledge that we are creatures
of parts—of genes, neurons, and so forth. We can still think of ourselves as some-
thing more than the operations of genes and the firing of neurons. Whatever we
do, we can and should insist on treatment of people that respects personhood,
autonomy, and dignity, even if we know that we are all only the construction of
various parts.
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George Annas
Genism, Racism, and the Prospect of Genetic Genocide
One great promise of genomics is that it will demonstrate that all
humans are essentially the same and help eliminate racism by destroy-
ing its pseudoscientific rationale. But a reductionistic genetics could sim-
ply replace racism with genism, and fuel a new eugenics project—to
construct “better humans” through genetic engineering. It has been sug-
gested that this will be all to the good for humanity, even that it is wrong
to think of genetically modified humans as post-humans. But that view is
ahistorical. If genetic engineering produces a different type of human,
the relationship between these new humans and “standard” humans is
potentially, even likely, lethal. Human history suggests differences will be
socially magnified and that the two now different types of humans could
consider each other as legitimate targets for preemptive extermination. 
It is this prospect for what I have termed “genetic genocide” that leads
me to conclude that we should apply the precautionary principle to
human genetic engineering and prohibit it by treaty. Substantive and
procedural conditions for creating and lifting a global prohibition on
human inheritable genetic alterations will be suggested.*
*Copyright © 2003 George Annas
My talk is going to follow on some of Professor Kevles’s ideas quite well. He
brought us up to where we are now, and I’m going to try to look at the future.
Prediction is always difficult. The question I’d like you to ask yourselves is
whether it is possible to stop nanotechnology or germ-line engineering from
creating a new, different kind of human being, if not a different species alto-
gether. However you answer that question, there is still another. Is there a
mechanism we can develop to direct the use of that technology and protect our-
selves from annihilation, extinction, and exploitation by a new, powerful sub-
species or species?
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Geneticists, and scientists in general, tend to be optimistic about their field
and often assume that all is going to work out well in the end. They frequently
argue that many of the dangers that alarm people—like genetically modified
foods or the possibilities of genetic genocide—are based on misunderstandings
of scientific facts. Steven Pinker urges us to base our bioethics policy on facts,
not fantasy. But I do not understand why ethics should be based only on facts,
while science can be based on speculation as well. I think both of us can fanta-
size about good and bad scenarios in the future.
When the Human Genome Project was first announced, many scientists
claimed that one of its benefits would be to discredit the concept of racism for all
time. It was going to prove that we are all fundamentally the same. It was going
to abolish racism and all the differences among human beings. That would have
been nice. But we are already seeing a counterattack on this benign view. It is
now claimed that since drugs act differently on blacks and whites, it really is not
true that there are not some fundamental biological difference among the races.
The point is not who is right, but that the promise that the Human Genome
Project was going to end racism was hype that is not going to be fulfilled. And
there are other forms of hype. One of them is that all we have to worry about is
protecting the subjects of human genetic experiments who will be injured by
them. What I want to talk about is the species-wide dangers and implications of
such technological developments.
It is important that we consider this point of view. Vaclav Havel argued that
only by developing a species consciousness can we hope to avoid totalitarian
dictatorships and the use of weapons of mass destruction. Similarly, Francis
Fukuyama derives the very notion of human rights from a previous conception
of human nature. After World War II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
established, first, that there was such a thing as human rights and, second, that
they were universal. From this was also derived the idea that there were specific
crimes against humanity.
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The usual crimes against humanity include things like murder, genocide,
slavery, torture, arbitrary detention, disappearance, and things of that nature.
But I want to argue that there is another kind of crime against humanity which
does not involve these types of destruction loosed against people with the per-
mission of the state. It involves a direct attack on the human species itself in an
effort to change the nature of what it means to be human, and to engage in
species-altering activities. It includes making germ-line genetic changes in an
individual that may make him so different from other members of his species
that he might be considered not as a member of the species or as belonging to a
different species entirely. Human cloning provides the perfect opportunity for
the world community to ban a technology that has worldwide, species-altering
implications. Germ-line engineering is another example of technological inter-
ventions that threaten to change the nature of what it means to be human. When
you change that, you undermine and take away the basis for human rights.
A fundamental human right is the freedom from having your body invaded
or forced against your will. This may involve a question of sterilization or adding
an implant to your brain that will improve you. That right is fundamental to
autonomy and personhood. I do not know how you could justify such a right in a
creature that is fundamentally different from you. Many scientists argue for
establishing such a right. They think it is a form of hubris to think we know how
to change a 3.5 billion-year-old DNA sequence to make better children.
Establishing this right would be only the beginning. We would also have to
set up an enforcement mechanism, something like the international criminal
court. We would also need an international treaty, with all nations involved. Last
of all, we would need a forum, some kind of international bioethics human rights
council democratically elected and representative of the entire species. Its job
would be to debate issues like cloning, germ-line genetics, nanotechnology,
xenografts, and any other type of procedure that was species-altering or that put
the human species at risk of extinction.
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Such procedures would be outlawed by the treaty. To change it and permit a
new technology, you would have to show that its benefits to humanity outweigh
its risks. And if there is some fundamental principle involved that we do not want
to violate, then a risk-benefit analysis would not be sufficient. Rulings of the
council would not necessarily be permanent, but there would be a precautionary
principle applied to species-altering procedures. The burden of proof would lie on
scientists, proponents of technology, and corporations to demonstrate that a new
development is a good thing. 
These measures are justified because once you change the nature of human
beings, there is the potential for genocide. Science fiction writers have been
thinking and writing about this for a long time. Once different creatures are per-
ceived as nonhuman, then a genocidal impulse develops. People who think a lot
about nanotechnology and robotics have come to similar conclusions. 
The hardest problem would be getting such a treaty passed. International
organizations presently face enormous procedural difficulties. Nevertheless, we
should outlaw reproductive cloning and germ-line engineering. But it is not at all
clear how such adjudications should be made. A cost-benefit analysis is not ade-
quate. What would the rules of decision be? When would the planet be safe for
new species? Maybe the species would have to wait for 100 years without a geno-
cide occurring before it is thought safe to introduce another species. Some will
say we could never get through 100 years without a genocide. But if we cannot go
100 years without killing ourselves, maybe we should not be trusted to create
new humans.
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S E S S I O N  F I V E
George Church
Ecology, Economics, and Exponentials: Modeling Technological
Goals and Human Nature
ABSTRACT NOT AVAILABLE
[Editor’s Note: George Church’s presentation made extensive use of charts and
other visual representations. A verbal summary is not able to convey his general
ideas or his specific points adequately. The following summary, therefore, will
necessarily appear disjointed and even incoherent in places.]
My talk will involve the convergence of genomics and computer science,
with an emphasis on what sorts of timelines are plausible. I will also discuss the
economic consequences, not only in terms of dollars, but also environments,
ecologies, and so forth. I would like to give you a feeling for the kinds of things
we do in systems biology, and then go on to discuss speculatively some implica-
tions it has for human nature. My background is in modeling, not only of the evo-
lution of biopolymers such as proteins and DNA, but also structures that
constitute molecular machines, and eventually whole ecosystems.
I have lived through two small revolutions, not as momentous as the
Galilean and Darwinian, but quite important nonetheless: recombinant DNA and
genomics. Both are reductionistic, and both rejuvenated systems biology, an old
discipline. We now think of molecular processes as machines, but we can inte-
grate them into metazoans like ourselves, cancerous stem cells, and ecosystems.
One way of modeling is to plot some calculated property on one axis and
another observed property on another. Then we look for outliers, which are not to
be swept away. They are not indicators that our model has failed. They are our
friends and are potential discoveries about how our methods are not working.
Some of these correlations have very interesting deviations from optimality. We
are interested in how to take this ten-thousand-year history of genetically manip-
ulating single molecules and, when we have a satisfactory level of precision, get
to diversity. Despite doubts about what is acceptable in human breeding terms, it
is quite possible that there is a great tolerance for diversity.
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We think about diversity especially when we consider the limits to what we
are able to do, and then try to extend them. Running speed, depths to which peo-
ple can dive, breadth of the visible wavelength, temperature people can endure,
the length of memory are all examples of limits that interest us. Once we exceed
these limits, are we still within the range of human nature as we know it? We
should remember that the Darwinian breakthrough, or clusters of Darwinian
breakthroughs, allowed us to become hyper-adaptable and no longer dependent
on DNA for inheritance and evolution. We are no longer limited by our germ-line.
For some people laptops are as much a part of their being as their DNA. Maybe
we should not change their germ-line but their laptops.
Does germ-line engineering hold the fastest promise for change? I would
argue that somatic engineering is much closer at hand. Change through germ-
line engineering takes about twenty years to manifest the result. On the other
hand, somatic engineering—putting inorganic prosthesis or organic chemicals or
somatic cell genetics into or outside our bodies—can take mere days. The other
problem with germ-line engineering is the ethics of allowing adults to choose for
their children or for other adults. Using the phenotype is more predictable. You
can choose among a series of fertilized eggs, but that’s not very predictable. By
the time to get to adulthood, on the other hand, it’s very clear what prostheses
and drugs will and will not work. Similarly, if we want to work on our cells, histo-
compatible adult stem cells may be more accessible and more appropriate, as will
interfaces with organic engineering, nanotechnology, and more ordinary inor-
ganic engineering.
When we plot growth in order to predict timelines, we see that the number
of CPUs or CPU power will certainly overtake that of the population. CPU growth
is definitely steeper than exponential growth and closer to a parabolic fit. When
we compare the processing power of computers and the human brain, using
Moore’s Law, we see a cross-over point at about ten to the fourteenth instruc-
tions per second. This does not address when or whether the entire internet will
be equivalent to human intelligence. In addition to physical limits, we also need
to think about cost limits and to compare them with other programs and their
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benefits, like launching satellites, or eradicating disease or sequencing the
human genome. While undertaking any project always costs something, we
should also remember than not undertaking them also entails a cost, which can
often be considerable. Five percent of the global gross domestic product is dedi-
cated to hackers and e-viruses. 
The cost of progress, however, is not measured only in dollars. There is also
the question of its effects on the environment. Since humans are hyper-adapt-
able, the amount of computing that we and our machines will be able to do is
going to be limited primarily by the amount of energy at our disposal. There is,
of course, sunlight and other sources of energy, like nuclear power. But we still
have the problem of getting the heat off the earth. Right now we are consuming
within three or four logs of the maximum. But not all energy is used for compu-
tation, and the efficiency of computation can change. In addition, there are alter-
native natural mechanisms that are doing similar jobs that are just now being
discovered.
What will happen to diversity? There is the problem that a replicating sys-
tem will turn the entire surface of the earth into itself. But there are other, more
insidious ways of losing diversity. We may have to start thinking seriously about
using geographical isolation to achieve this goal. It has played one of the major
roles in evolution. We need to know not only common mutations, but every muta-
tion that occurs, not just in our germ-line, but in our somatic cells as well. One
problem here is devising the instrumentation that can monitor these changes
and making it inexpensive enough to use. 
We have seen maybe four logs of improvement in efficiency over the course
of the genome project, but we’re still ten logs away from the efficiency of some
very commonly used equipment, like video recording. We would like to be able to
get DNA analysis and nucleic acid analysis down to the level of video recording
costs. We have discovered that existing organisms can do inorganic and organic
nanofabrication beautifully. We need to harvest the biosphere for these remark-
able molecular machines. In a certain sense, therefore, we already have achieved
atomic precision. 
44
I’ve been talking about systems biology because it is so embracing and more
holistic than our usual speculations. The timelines I’ve been discussing are often
higher than exponential. They may not continue at these rates, but their limits
are determined by mass and cost. We should start thinking about our inheri-
tance in larger terms than DNA. Germ-line changes are the least of our worries.
Copyright © George Church
S E S S I O N  F I V E
Lynn Margulis
Biosphere Technologies and the Myth of Individuality
The “Gaia Hypothesis” explains the tendency of the Earth’s surface to
maintain its temperature, reactive gas concentration, and alkalinity within
astronomically narrow limits for millions of years. The self-maintaining
properties of cells, organisms, communities, and ecosystems can be
extrapolated to the atmosphere and surface sediments of planet Earth.
Not only are we people (Homo sapiens mammals), one of the more than
10 million existing species components of the Gaian regulatory system
but so are our machines. I argue that although not by themselves alive,
like viruses and beehives, machines are capable of growth, reproduction
mutation, and therefore evolution. Machines change through time. Even
though they are not self-sustaining and they have no metabolism,
machines do evolve. 
No single species is privileged. Many populations of organisms, like us,
disrupt their own habitats by outgrowing their own ecological support sys-
tems. The Gaian Earth-regulating system which responds to perturbation
by changes in metabolism, differential survival, growth, and species origin
and extinctions maintains dynamic stability of the planet’s surface. The
fossil record informs us that, for members of any given species, habitat
loss is followed by population decline and, eventually, by extinction. 
Technohumans grow now as “mammalian weeds.” Non-human ecosys-
tems are converted to the agro-urban-technological, primarily by water and
solar-radiation rerouting, soil depletion, and fossil-fuel combustion. The
extremely successful recent human reproductive strategies alter or even
extinguish lacustrine, riparian, dunal, marine coastal, forest, grassland,
chaparral, and other non-human, primarily terrestrial, ecosystems. The
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agro-urban network overgrowth adds cellulose, hemicellulose, lignin, poly-
meric plastics, metal oxides, aldehydes, aromatics, and hundreds of other
compounds and sedimentary particles even to ocean water. The acceler-
ated patterns of surface transformation to the agro-urban network cou-
pled with Homo sapiens-induced species extinction are reminiscent of a
phenomenon at a smaller size-scale: malignant melanoma and other solid
tumor metastasis. Although ecological alteration of the Gaian body politic
is about 105 times larger than melanoma or other cancers, the two phe-
nomena share at least these characteristics: uncontrolled growth stimu-
lated by the prototactic imperative to reproduce, and metabolic
dependency on surrounding supportive communities by rerouting of
energy, fluids, and organic compounds to the sites of most rapid prolifera-
tion. Lack of neural or other centralized control unleashes destructive,
compulsive, proliferative behavior in cells, tissues, organisms, popula-
tions, communities, and beyond. Although we perceive ourselves, usually
as individuals, scientific analyses shows each of us to be at least 10 per-
cent dry weight “foreign” (i.e., bacterial). By means of a video (I hope) we
will see how we, like all “individual animals” are complex composites,
integrated communities that require chemical, microbiological, and ecolog-
ical studies to be properly understood.*
*Copyright © 2003 Lynn Margulis
[Editor’s Note: A large part of Professor Margulis’s presentation consisted of
slides and a long film of various microorganisms. Some of her commentary
which is comprehensible only in conjunction with its illustrations has therefore
regrettably been omitted.]
I feel so humble in the face of the past that I cannot talk about the future.
The past, the evolutionary past, is so complex that thinking about the future in
technological terms just boggles my mind. Emily Dickinson wrote:
A little Madness in the Spring
Is wholesome even for the King,
But God be with the Clown—
Who ponders this tremendous scene—
This whole Experiment of Green—
As if it were his own!
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That’s how I feel about this meeting.  It’s clowning to think that we can
predict in detail the carbon dioxide of the atmosphere or the germ-line.
I want to impress you with the fact that technology belongs to the bios-
phere—what traditionally is called the noosphere. I want to show you some tech-
nologies that are extremely ancient. There is, for example, architectural habitat
alteration that controls light, temperature, chemical composition, and water
better than this room does. The one thing that distinguishes our species from
the rest of nature is speech and symbolism. We can talk, and therefore we can lie.
Deceit is all over biology.
When we look at these ancient natural technologies and then think about
what I call the myth of individuality, we begin to appreciate the extent to which
organisms are composite. We are also going to see how the World Wide Web, a
communication among what looks like individual organisms, has been on the
earth for maybe 35 hundred million years. It’s not silicon technology, but it is
true technology. The idea that humans can synthetically adopt and incorporate
photosynthesis into themselves is a real possibility and already exists in nature.
Some predatory animals have developed associations with very efficient 
photo-synthesizers.
Examples of biospheric technology are the large termite mounds in Africa.
Temperature there is regulated to within half a degree centigrade, humidity is
maintained at 95 percent in extremely dry surroundings, and there is as much of
the termite mound below ground as there is above it. Air flows through it, and
there are divisions maintained into morgues, school rooms, and hatcheries. The
termites derive their source of carbon and energy from the fungi they have
learned to grow as crops. There can be as many as 30 million termites in these
mounds, along with all sorts of associated animals that live with them. 
We share 99.9 percent of our DNA with chimps. From a biological point of
view, we are just another chimp. If we want to think about technological poten-
tials for ourselves, we might take a look at how problems have already been
solved in nature. Here is a stromatolite from the sea floor. It is the product of
bacteria and has lasted hundreds of thousands if not hundreds of millions of
years. It is a very complex community of microorganisms that are constantly
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maintaining and stabilizing sediment and recycling carbon and phosphorus in
ways we have not even begun to approach. There are also examples of web organ-
isms that communicate with each other, and photo-synthesizers that produce
carbon and energy for the rest of the community and recycle the sulphur. These
are stable, worldwide communities. We don’t know how they’re communicating,
but they are communicating well enough for the same composition to be funda-
mentally the same worldwide. 
As for the subject of individuality, here are mollusks that live entirely by
photosynthesizing, having incorporated photosynthesis into their own bodies.
Some animals incorporate the photosynthetic chloroplasts of algae. Others actu-
ally focus light on the photosynthetic entities that support it. These mechanisms
suggest more feasible technologies than changing the germ-line of people.
[Professor Margulis showed a video and commented on it.]
Any organism has a multiple genomic background. The theory of the origin
of species does not really lie in mutation. Mutations just modify. If you want to
change organisms in serious ways, you can think about acquiring and integrat-
ing genomes that have already been optimized by natural selection. I want Emily
Dickinson to have the last word:
But nature is a stranger yet;
The ones that cite her most
Have never passed her haunted house,
Nor simplified her ghost.
To pity those that know her not
Is helped by the regret
That those who know her, know her less
The nearer her they get.
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S E S S I O N  S I X
Roger Shattuck
A Tale of Two Species
ABSTRACT NOT AVAILABLE
Steven Pinker quoted Ortega y Gasset that “Man has no nature.” But the quote
continues. “What he has is history.” I would like to discuss one of the most strik-
ing early thought experiments in human nature, which has not been mentioned
at this conference. It makes use of the commanding position occupied in the
eighteenth century by voyages of discovery to unknown lands to discover and
describe unknown flora, fauna, and exotic human societies. A similar position is
occupied today by research in molecular biology. Gulliver’s Travels appeared in
1726, and its veracity was vouched for by its publisher. It is a classic work of
literature and a clever hoax. It is also an experiment on human life. 
In the fourth book, Gulliver is cast ashore on an island where human nature
has been passed through a prism. A society of horse-like creatures, the
Houyhnhnms, has received reason and language and lives in peace, while bands
of apelike Yahoos get the rest and live like quarrelsome brutes. Gulliver spurns
the humanoid Yahoos, and in one uproarious episode a naked rutting female
Yahoo goes after him as an attractive representative of her own species. Gulliver
works himself up into a rant against both species and goes mad, rescued finally
by a humane Portuguese sea captain.
In Swift’s day, the satire was taken to be a complex political and philosophi-
cal warning against going too far in favoring reason above all other faculties and
feelings. For us today, Swift’s tale of an island where humans have evolved or
regressed into two separate species is a double dystopia, a warning against tam-
pering with our nature, lest we cause ourselves grief and diminishment. The
monstrosity of both the bestial Yahoos and the haughty Houyhnhnms unhinges
Gulliver to the point of insanity. 
A second work, H. G. Wells’s The Time Machine, was written in 1895 and
appropriates Swift’s device of a traveler marooned in a land inhabited by two
species descended from humans. The vacuous doll-like Eloi, descended from
wealthy landowners, live without toil. Driven underground long ago, the working
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classes have turned into Morlocks, machine-making savages who feed on the
Eloi like livestock. For Wells, the future reveals the social and biological deca-
dence of mankind brought about by our incorrigible selfishness.
Now, a century later, in Lee Silver’s Remaking Eden, we find yet another trav-
eler to a society in which humankind has evolved into two distinct species: the
gene-rich, favored by every medical, genetic, and scientific cure and enhance-
ment, and the naturals, left behind in the dust of unimproved humanity. It is a
giddily optimistic book, promoting reproductive genetics and germ-line
enhancements of every kind. Silver names Wells twice, but neglects Swift,
although he is our Gulliver more than he knows. He endorses and justifies the
genetic measures available to improve ourselves and our offspring, unrestrained
in the open marketplace by any special scruple or limit other than potential indi-
vidual harm. Like Gulliver fawning over the reasonable Houyhnhnms, Silver
revels in the “unimaginable extensions of human capacities available to favored
children.” Only in the epilogue does he express some misgivings. A fictional 
Dr. Varship of the future surveys the results of genetic enhancements and won-
ders if we have gone wrong. But he recognizes that it is too late to do anything at
all. He expresses a regretful resignation over the division of human nature into
two incompatible and stunted species. But there is no satire here, no spoof, only
muffled sorrow. I have rarely read a book so deeply ambivalent trying to put on a
brave face.
One last point, one of the most desired human enhancements is healthy
longevity, culminating in immortality. Silver’s long list of enhancements in the
last chapter, including cognitive attributes, moral character improvements and
radio telephathy, cries out for longevity and immortality as the culminating
offerings. But Silver has avoided the big question: Is genetically programmed
death one of the defining characteristics of human nature? He therefore missed
the opportunity to carry Swift’s and Wells’s story to the further challenge of
mortality and human nature. Is life without death worth living?
I’d like to add that I respect Silver’s book very much and was deeply stirred
by it. This is the result.
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I would like to ask two questions. The first is: What kind of humans do we want
in the future and how would we like to change them? The second is: How do we
create a world where differences are respected and not a grounds for extermina-
tion. To explore these questions I want to look at the most well-known caution-
ary tales of our time, Brave New World and 1984.
Brave New World shows a society based on conditioning and drugs. There,
you are born into pods of 96 identical embryos and assigned a specific class,
which defined you for life—what job you’d do, what you’d wear, etc. Not only were
you conditioned to be that way, but if you were found to be dysfunctional, or
needed to maintain your functioning, you were administered slogans or heavy-
duty drugs, which many people point out are already available. This view of soci-
ety, in which we dehumanize ourselves and take away the freedom and creativity
that we think defines us as humans, is, by the way, essentially the view adopted
by the President’s bioethics council. They think that the only way to stop dehu-
manization and the commodification of humans is to prohibit things like human
cloning and germ-line genetic engineering and to worry a lot about embryo
research, organ and egg sales, etc. I think their next step will be trying to regu-
late Lee Silver’s reproductive technology. They would be horrified by the word
reprogenetics, and they will try to stop it.
1984 is Orwell’s vision of a government that does not rely on conditioning
and drugs to dehumanize its people, but on fear, surveillance, and a strategy of
perpetual war to convince its citizens that they should surrender their humanity
and submit to a regime that observes and controls them. Since September 11th,
Big Brother has emerged as a much more likely scenario than a Brave New
World. John Ashcroft says he’s going to protect our civil rights by doing away
with the need for warrants for searches and wiretaps, putting people in jail with-
out habeas corpus, sticking people on Guantanamo, removed from constitutional
rights, and countenancing torture. We will have to start taking very seriously a
society based on perpetual war, especially in light of developments in nanotech-
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nology and some of the genetic technologies we have heard about. Any powerful
technology in the wrong hands reverses its potential for good into one for evil. 
Eric Fromm asked if it was possible to change human nature so that we
would forget our longing for freedom, dignity, integrity, and love. In other words,
can man be made to forget that he is human? I do not know the answer to this
question, but I would like to remind you that there are at least two other life
forms on the planet that will have a lot to say about our future. One is the
corporation. The other is the nongovernmental organization.
Corporate life forms are potentially immortal. They have no natural life
span. Since they can also acquire wealth forever, they can grow to be very, very
powerful over decades and centuries. They can control large segments of our
society and our technology. They are also already running most of the govern-
ments of the world. 
Nongovernemntal organizations are a life form that people have very
ambivalent feelings about. They have grown in numbers almost exponentially in
the past decade, as a counterbalancing force both to governments and, most
importantly, to corporations. Some people look to them as the best hope for pre-
serving the planet and humanity. In the last thirty or forty years, most of the
degradation of the planet has been caused by corporations doing whatever they
want in order to extract resources from the earth. Environmentalists have tried
to plead with governments, with very little success. Now nongovernmental
organizations are trying to find new strategies, like renting rain forests or buy-
ing land and keeping it for purposes of biodiversity and conservation. 
When we ask how we can create a world where differences are respected and
not grounds for extermination, we may talk about governments and self-regula-
tion, but we should also recognize the existence of two other life forms that have
enormous power for good and for evil—the corporation and the nongovernmental
agency. 
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Anthony Gottlieb
When I first starting thinking about the subject of this conference, I remem-
bered a book by David Bolter, Turing’s Man, which deals with the impact of the
computer on the way we think about ourselves. It argues that the current concep-
tion most of us hold regarding human nature has been significantly affected by
the development of the digital computer. One of the things I’d like to talk about
today is the concept of a defining technology for an era. A defining technology is
a way of doing things that is so successful and impressive that people say,
“Everything works like that, even ourselves. It’s the key to the universe.”
The first defining technology we know about is from the Greeks. It is the
idea of the craftsman—in particular the potter—who fashions form out of raw
matter. Plato’s divine master craftsman who fashioned the world out of raw mat-
ter, imposing form on it the way a potter does, is an example of this. His theory
of Ideas is, in effect, a consequence of this image in the way it sees physical real-
ity as the imposition of form on matter.
The next informing technology was the machine—in particular the clock.
People thought the whole universe was a clock and the human body a machine.
That was Descartes’ thesis, although he thought the mind could not be handled
satisfactorily that way. His implausible and unconvincing attempt to relate mind
and body led people to conceptualize the mind itself as a machine. The concep-
tion of scientific knowledge was also informed by that defining technology.
According to Locke, if we could ever understand all the bits of the world in the
way that a clockmaker understands the clock he has manufactured, we would
really understand nature. Most of us probably still think of nature that way.
The third great defining technology is, of course, the digital computer. It is
related to the mechanical world picture and builds on and extends, rather than
obliterating it. We think of our minds as if there were computers and regard our
memories and even our characters as software running on the hardware of the
brain. In science fiction we wonder whether we will be able to transport our-
selves vast distances by downloading ourselves, either by transmitting matter or
simply information. There are also people who speak of the whole universe as if
it were a computer. That is our own defining technology.
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An important question to ask is: Is this the end of the road? Is this the real
defining technology? Is this what the universe is really like? It is impossible to
answer that question because, by definition, the defining technology is the one
we think of as really embodying the truth. But if we adopt the point of view of
the intellectual historian, we see that in the past people thought that they really
possessed the truth. Are we any different? Will there be other technologies that
will lead us to think of the universe and ourselves in an entirely different way?
Part of the answer to that question depends on whether another technology
will come along that works sufficiently impressively. I’ve thought of a few possi-
bilities. One is nonclassical quantum computers. We may start to think of our-
selves as being sometimes in superpositions or states. We may borrow the
language of quantum mechanics to understand our own human nature. Another
possibility is string theory, which might affect the ways we think about our-
selves, although it is difficult to say just how. A third possibility is somatic engi-
neering, including prosthetics, pharmacology, and nanotechnology. Will we start
to think of human nature as a set of states that we can manipulate with drugs,
for example?
I should also mention that the main technology we have been discussing at
this conference has also been affected by the digital computer. We speak of the
genetic code and try to explain it almost completely in terms of the digital com-
puter. Will that change if another defining technology evolves?
The last issue I would like to raise comes from an essay on nature written in
the 1850s by John Stuart Mill. In it, he refutes the idea that there is a coherent
objection to what we might do technologically by claiming that it interferes with
nature. Objections like this, in fact, are based on a systematic ambiguity in the
way we use the term nature. If by nature we mean “everything that happens,” then
we do not have to worry. If nature is everything that happens, we can never change
what happens. If, on the other hand, we mean by nature what happens without
human intervention, then the only way we can avoid interfering with nature is by
doing absolutely nothing. So I do not think that the notion of interfering with
nature is even remotely useful or interesting. If we want to evaluate a project, we
should instead look at the consequences and the harms that might ensue.
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Evelyn Fox Keller
I originally thought I would speak against the idea of human nature, but I decided
not to, primarily because I believe in it, or in something like it. I believe that we
are biologically determined. There are, however, several problems with this posi-
tion. First, I don’t think we are determined solely by individual biology. Second,
talk about human nature usually involves us in all sorts of difficulties that keep
us going in circles. It ends up only encouraging those opposed to the idea of
human nature. Let me try to specify some of the difficulties we often get into.
Several people at this conference defined human nature as something that
is universal to the human species. There are several problems with this notion.
First of all, it is almost inevitably a normative notion. What counts as a human
being if we demand that human nature be universal? Human beings are bipedal,
erect animals. Does that mean that people without legs are not human? Is the
desire to have children an essential and universal part of human nature? What
does that stricture do to people who don’t want children? So one of the first
things to stress about human nature is that, if indeed there is such a thing, it is
necessarily variable in the species. 
Another difficulty with most talk about human nature is the problem of
location. Where is human nature? For most of the speakers at this conference, it
resides inside of our bodies. The brain makes up the mind. But I could argue that
all our brains together collectively make up the individual mind. The individual
human mind is a product of sociality. It is our sociality that is distinctively
human about us. Many people argue that what distinguishes us from apes is our
capacity for mimicry and imitation. They establish a social world that enables
the process of cultural evolution, which in turn changes our brains. It changes it
in two ways: the culture in which we live rewires our brains; but the blueprint of
who we are includes more than our DNA. DNA itself changes in response to cul-
tural evolution. The Baldwin effect states that when we change human nature,
we necessarily change the conditions under which natural selection operates.
Take, for example, the arrival of literacy. Literacy did not arise in individual
brains, but out of a social community. But the fact of literacy changes our
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brains. It enhances our memory, our capacity and rewires us in important ways.
Literacy is still not a universal trait, but the time will come when we can say that
literacy is an essential part of human nature. But where will it reside? That will
partly depend on the stage of our evolutionary process. We may have become bio-
logically adapted to literacy in important ways, and in the process changed our
human nature.
Yet another problem that has surfaced in these discussion is the assumption
that if a trait is universal, it must be genetic. The example of literacy shows that
this is not so. A trait can be universal without being genetic. It is important to
see that traits that are universal cannot a priori be distinguished on the basis of
whether they are genetically determined or the products of particular social and
cultural forms. 
How do we know what is universal? We labor under an almost irresistible
tendency to extrapolate from our own cultural expectations to the species as a
whole. For example, we have been told that it is wired into our human nature to
maximize our self-interest. Recent studies, however, show that not all people
pursue their lives according to the principle of rational economic man. Similarly,
the desire to have our own genetic offspring is important in this culture, but not
in others. So let us be very wary about talking about human nature as a univer-
sal characteristic.
Finally, there has been very little discussion at this conference about chang-
ing species-wide characteristics. Most of it had to do with changing the nature of
some humans. Two questions immediately arise. Which humans are we going to
change, and how are we going to change them? Right now we are particularly
infatuated with the possibilities of change presented by genetics. But there are
all sorts of nongenetic ways of approaching this project. One of the most impor-
tant ways is changing the cultural, economic situation of people, a mode of
changing human nature that has been little talked about in this community.
If we want to talk about changing the nature of some human beings, then we
should be explicit about the various ways in which we can do it. We must then
envisage the results, compare them and assess risks, cost, and their implications
for future generations. What is so special about genetically manipulating the
nature of some humans?
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machines the human capacity for common-sense reasoning. His book Society of Mind is considered a
basic text for exploring intellectual structure and function, and for understanding the diversity of the
mechanisms interacting in intelligence and thought.
He received the BA and PhD in mathematics at Harvard and Princeton. In 1951 he built the SNARC, the
first neural network simulator. His other inventions include mechanical hands and other robotic devices,
the confocal scanning microscope, the “Muse” synthesizer for musical variations (with E. Fredkin), and
the first LOGO “turtle” (with S. Papert). A member of the NAS, NAE, and Argentine NAS, he has
received the ACM Turing Award, the MIT Killian Award, the Japan Prize, the IJCAI Research Excellence
Award, the Rank Prize and the Robert Wood Prize for Optoelectronics, and the Benjamin Franklin Medal. 
Christine Peterson
Foresight Institute
P.O. Box 61058
Palo Alto, CA 94306 USA
E-mail: Peterson@foresight.org
Christine Peterson writes, lectures, and briefs the media on coming powerful technologies, especially
nanotechnology. She is cofounder and president of Foresight Institute, a nonprofit which educates the
public, technical community, and policymakers on nanotechnology and its long-term effects.  
She directs the Foresight Conferences on Molecular Nanotechnology, organizes the Foresight Institute
Feynman Prizes, and chairs the Foresight Gatherings.
She lectures on nanotechnology to a wide variety of audiences, focusing on making this complex field
understandable, and on clarifying the difference between near-term commercial advances and the “Next
Industrial Revolution” arriving in the next few decades.
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Her work is motivated by a desire to help Earth’s environment and traditional human communities avoid
harm and instead benefit from expected dramatic advances in technology. This goal of spreading bene-
fits led to an interest in new varieties of intellectual property, including open source software, a term
she is credited with originating.
Wearing her for-profit hat, she works with Freedom Technology Ventures LLC to advise investors on eval-
uating startups in nanotech and other key technologies and to help entrepreneurs improve their plans
and locate funding. She also serves on the Advisory Board of Alameda Capital.
Christine holds a bachelor’s degree in chemistry from MIT.
Steven Pinker
Johnstone Family Professor of Psychology, Harvard University
Harvard University
William James Hall 
33 Kirkland Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
E-mail: pinker@wjh.harvard.edu
Steven Pinker is an experimental psychologist who is interested in all aspects of language and mind. 
For the past fifteen years his research has focused on the distinction between irregular verbs like 
bring-brought and regular verbs like walk-walked. 
Professor Pinker received his bachelor’s degree from McGill University in 1976 and his PhD in psychol-
ogy from Harvard in 1979. After teaching at MIT for 21 years, he returned to Harvard in 2003 as the
Johnstone Family Professor of Psychology. Pinker’s experimental research on cognition and language
won the Troland Award from the National Academy of Sciences and two prizes from the American
Psychological Association. Professor Pinker also serves on numerous editorial and advisory boards,
including the Usage Panel of The American Heritage Dictionary and the scientific advisory board for “The
Decade of Behavior.” He has appeared in many television documentaries and writes frequently in the
popular press, including in The New York Times, Time, and Slate, and is also a Humanist Laureate and
the recipient of three honorary doctorates.
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Stanley Rosen
Borden Parker Bowne Professor of Philosophy; University Professor, Boston University
College of Arts and Sciences, Philosophy Department
Boston University
745 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
E-mail: srosen@bu.edu
Professor Rosen specializes in the history of philosophy, metaphysics, social and political
philosophy, and contemporary thought. Prior to coming to Boston University in the fall of
1994, Stanley Rosen was Evan Pugh Professor at Pennsylvania State University. He has also
taught as a visiting professor at the University of California in San Diego, the University of
Nice, and the Scuola Superiore in Pisa. 
Professor Rosen has published fourteen books, the first a volume of poems, the others on
subjects ranging from Plato to Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and analytical philosophy, post-
modern hermeneutics, and the problem of nihilism. In addition, Professor Rosen has pub-
lished over thirty papers in books and over sixty articles in professional journals, many in
French, German, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Serbian, and Hebrew translations. He has
held a variety of fellowships and honorary positions, including the Companys Professorship at
the University of Barcelona and the presidency of the Metaphysical Society of America. He
was a Fulbright research professor at the University of Paris, a postdoctoral fellow of the
Humanities Research Institute of the University of Wisconsin, and pursued his research at
Tübingen and Heidelberg Universities and the London School of Economics. Dr. Rosen is also
the recipient of an honorary doctorate from the University of Lisbon (1997). In 1999 he was
chosen to be the recipient of the Neu Family Award for Excellence in Teaching from the
College of Arts and Sciences.
In November 2001, there was a colloquium on his work at the University of Paris, and in April
2002, there was another at Boston University.
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Richard Schacht
Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
105 Gregory Hall, MC-468
810 South Wright Street
Urbana, IL 61801
E-mail: rschacht@uiuc.edu
Professor Schacht’s interests include post-Kantian continental philosophy (especially Nietzsche and
Hegel), philosophical anthropology, social theory, and value theory. He has been a professor of philoso-
phy at UIUC since 1980 and a Jubilee Professor of Liberal Arts and Sciences since 1990. Professor
Schacht also serves as Senate Council Chair for the UIUC Faculty-Student Senate, is the executive
director of the North American Nietzsche Society, and is affiliated with the Unit for Criticism and
Interpretive Theory. He holds a bachelor’s degree from Harvard and earned his master’s and PhD from
Princeton. He also studied at Tübingen University in Germany.
Professor Schacht’s publications include: Alienation (1970), Hegel and After (1975), Nietzsche (1983),
Classical Modern Philosophers (1984), Classical Modern Philosophers: Descartes to Kant (1984), The
Future of Alienation (1994), and Making Sense of Nietzsche (1995). In addition, he has published more
than forty essays and over thirty articles and has edited several books.
Roger Shattuck
Professor Emeritus of French; University Professor Emeritus, Boston University
Department of Modern Foreign Languages and Literatures
Boston University
718 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215 
Professor Shattuck is a distinguished literary critic and one of the world’s foremost authorities on the
works of Marcel Proust. He earned his bachelor’s degree at Yale and was appointed to the Society of
Fellows at Harvard. He has been a recipient of both a Fulbright and a Guggenheim grant and was a pro-
fessor of romance languages at the University of Texas. He has served on the Advisory Board of the
National Translation Center and has held the title of Provéditeur Général du Collège de Palaphysique. He
has also served as President of the Association of Literary Scholars and Critics. His publications include
Proust’s Way: A Field Guide to In Search of Lost Time (2000), Forbidden Knowledge: A Brilliant
Exploration of the Dark Side of Human Ingenuity and Imagination (1996), Marcel Proust (1974); and The
Banquet Years: The Origins of the Avant-Garde in France, 1885 to World War One (1961).
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Lee Silver
Professor of Molecular Biology and Public Affairs, Department of Molecular Biology, Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University
Princeton University 
404 Robertson Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544-1013
E-mail: lsilver@princeton.edu
Professor Silver received his PhD at Harvard University. He is an internationally renowned molecular
biologist and expert on biomedical ethics, legal issues, and the societal challenges posed by advances
in biotechnology. Professor Silver is a member of the Program in Science, Technology & Environmental
Policy, the Center for Health and Well-being, and the Office of Population Research, at the Woodrow
Wilson School. He is the author of Remaking Eden: How Genetic Engineering and Cloning Will Transform
the American Family published in 15 languages. His research interests include social and political analy-
sis of the influence of popular belief systems and religion on the acceptance of biotechnology, and the
influence of biotechnology on popular belief systems concerning humanity, life, and soul. His forthcom-
ing book on these issues is called Challenging Mother Nature: Biotechnology in a Spiritual World. He is
a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and was a member of the
New Jersey Bioethics Commission Task Force, formed to recommend reproductive policy positions for
the New Jersey State Legislature. He has testified on reproductive and genetic technologies before U.S.
Congressional and New York State Senate committees.
Alfred Tauber
Professor of Philosophy; Professor of Medicine; Director, Center for Philosophy and History of Science;
Affiliate Faculty, Law, Medicine and Ethics Program, Boston University
College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy
Boston University
745 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
E-mail: ait@bu.edu
Alfred Tauber is a hematologist and biochemist by training. From his interest in basic immunology, he
began a critical examination of modern biology and medicine. These studies have focused on scientific
epistemology: positivism, reductionism, and the relationship of facts and values. As the Zoltan Kohn
Professor of Medicine at the Boston University School of Medicine, Dr. Tauber teaches ethics at the
Boston Medical Center and was appointed director of the Center for Philosophy and History of Science
at Boston University in 1993. Before joining Boston University School of Medicine in 1982, he spent
four years on the faculty at Harvard Medical School, and also served an internship and residency at the
University of Washington Affiliated Hospitals, followed by advanced training at Tufts-New England
Medical Center, Harvard Medical School, and the Robert B. Brigham Hospital.
T H E  F U T U R E  O F  H U M A N  N A T U R E
A Symposium on the Promises and Challenges of the Revolutions in Genomics and Computer Science
69
Participants’ Biographies
Dr. Tauber is the author of five books, the most recent being Henry David Thoreau and the Moral Agency
of Knowing (2001) and Confessions of a Medicine Man: An Essay in Popular Philosophy (1999). He is
also the editor of numerous works, and has published more than sixty papers on ethics and on the
history and philosophy of science and medicine. 
Dr. Tauber earned a BS from Tufts University and an MD from Tufts University School of Medicine. 
He was elected to the Tufts Board of Trustees in 2003 and currently serves on the Academic Affairs
Committee.
Tommaso Toffoli
Associate Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Boston University
Boston University
8 St. Mary’s Street
Boston, MA 02215
E-mail: tt@bu.edu
Tommaso Toffoli is professor of electrical and computer engineering at Boston University, where he also
heads the Programmable Matter Group. His primary research interests are the fundamental connec-
tions between Physics and Computation. He is the author, with Norman Margolus, of Cellular Automata
Machines: A New Environment for Modeling (1987) and has published numerous papers.
Professor Toffoli holds a PhD in computer and communication sciences from the University of Michigan
and a Doctor of Physics from the University of Rome (Italy).
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